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This review is written to fulfill two tasks.
Firstly, it is the first Polish comprehensive
analysis of the Draft Constitutional Treaty
prepared by the European Convention.
A comprehensive view of the Treaty is
extremely important because only in that
perspective one can see the merits and de-
merits of the project. Secondly, in this re-
view – after a careful analysis of the content
of the Treaty – the authors have attempted
to identify and justify the most important
new proposals, especially from the Polish
perspective. The Treaty from the viewpoint
of an acceding country is very controversial.
One of the most important problematic is-
sues presented in the Draft is the altering of
the Nice Treaty (this matter will be discus-
sed in depth further down). 
The first part of the review shows the po-
litical context of the Draft Constitutional
Treaty. It is followed by a systematic analy-
sis of the most important chapters of the
Constitution – the functioning of the
Union, institutional changes, all the way to
the reforms of the pillar structure. At the
end, the authors provide a catalogue of pro-
posals amending the current document,
putting a stress on those which will be of
great importance during the Intergovern-
mental Conference. 
1. THE NICE COMPROMISE,





Fifty years after creation, the European
Union has reached a level of „critical
mass” (understood in a positive sense) – it
has created a Single Market, established
EMU, introduced the Euro and „levelled
up” political integration. On the other
hand, the Union suffers a deep structural
crisis and lacks political identity, which
makes profound reforms indispensable.
The third aspect is the expansion of the
Union on an unprecedented scale – no pre-
vious expansion has involved nearly do-
ubling the number of member-states, ne-
ver have the gaps of wealth between them
been as profound. 
In response to that, current EU members
were faced with two vital problems: 
1) How to maintain the pace of integration? 
2) How to restrain the weakest countries
from dominating the integration pro-
cess? 
One could easily see that answers to the-
se issues were sought during the IGC 2000
and, subsequently, in the activities of the
Convention. They have not yet been found
and that is precisely what makes the IGC
2003/2004 exceedingly difficult. 
The candidate countries, among them 
Poland, also have several problems: as 
countries which for many years will be in
a weaker position in the Union, they seek
a Union that is effective and strong. On the







































other hand, they are particularly concerned
about EU decision-making procedures.
This is based on their lack of experience on
the single market. Last but not least, the ac-
ceding countries work under pressure exer-
ted by their societies, which are very sensi-
tive to the problem of sovereignty. 
During IGC 2000, EU member-states de-
cided to finalize the process of enlargement
as quickly as possible, thus limiting the du-
ration of the Nice institutional compromise
to the point where the Union reaches 27
members. The candidate countries perce-
ived the compromise very positively – it
both ended the period of EU's „institutio-
nal transition” and made it possible for the-
se countries to take active part in the
Union's mainstream changes. 
Voices calling for an amendment of the
Nice compromise started being heard right
after the end of the summit. During the
works of the Convention, the proponents of
these alterations succeeded, re-opened the
Nice compromise and changed the voting
system. At the same time, the planned IGC
was moved ahead to the time before enlarge-
ment and scheduled to last for a very short
period (October-December 2003). It was es-
sential for the acceding countries to obtain
an equal footing during the IGC, which they
had been granted on the base of the Copen-
hagen and Thessalonica Summits. 
The Laeken Declaration of December
2001 underlined four major tasks for the
Convention: simplification of the existing
Treaties, clear delimitation of powers be-
tween the EU and the Member States based
on the principle of subsidiarity, the status
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
the role of national parliaments in the Eu-
ropean structure. After 16 months of work,
the Convention concluded by submitting
the Draft Constitutional Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union. 
The Constitutional Treaty is divided into
four main parts. 
The first part is split into 9 Titles: 
I Definition and Objectives of the
Union, 
II Fundamental Rights and Citizenship
of the Union, 
III Union Competences, 
IV The Union Institutions, 
V Exercise of Union Competence, 
VI The Democratic Life of the Union, 
VII The Union Finances, 
VIII The Union and its Immediate Envi-
ronment, 
IX Union Membership; 
The second part is the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights (approved with slight chan-
ges). 
The third part (The Policies and Functio-
ning of the Union) is split into 7 Titles of
varying size: 
I Clauses of General Application, 
II Non-discrimination and Citizenship, 
III Internal Policies and Action (a very vast
title, which in five chapters groups
the law associated with the functio-
ning of the Single Market), 
IV Association of the Overseas Coun-
tries and Territories, 
V The Union's External Action (combi-
ning in 8 chapters the CFSP, CSDP,
Common Commercial Policy, Coope-
ration with Third Countries and Hu-
manitarian Aid, Restrictive Measures,
International Agreements, Union’s
Relations with International Organi-
zations and Third Countries, and
Union Delegations and Implementa-
tion of Solidarity Clause), 
VI Functioning of the Union (split into
3 chapters: I Provisions Governing the
Institutions, II Financial Provisions
and III Enhanced Cooperation); 
VII Common Provisions; 
and the fourth part (General and Final
Provisions). 
Additionally, the Draft is supplemented
by 4 protocols and 3 declarations. The pro-
tocols are as follows: On the Role of Natio-
nal Parliaments in the European Union, On
the Application of the Principles of Subsi-
diarity and Proportionality, On Representa-
tion of Citizens in the European Parliament
and the Weighting of Votes in the European
Council and the Council of Ministers, and
On the Euro Group and Amending the Eu-
ratom Treaty. 
The declarations are dealing with: the
Protocol on the Representation of Citizens
in the European Parliament and the Weigh-
ting of Votes in the European Council and
the Council of Ministers, On the Creation
of a European External Action Service and,
in the Final Act, on Signing the Treaty Esta-
blishing the Constitution. 






































2. The Bases of the European
Union – what is the Euro-
pean Union meant to be? 
The current structure of the European
Union is very complicated. The Union is
based on three pillars: the first – a federal
one, is the home of the two Communities –
the European Community and Euratom;
the second pillar is the Common Foreign
and Security Policy; the third – Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.
The second and third pillars have an inter-
governmental character, that is – govern-
ments cooperate in these fields on the basis
of international law (the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union). 
One could easily predict that Member
States would decide to transform the Euro-
pean Union into an international organiza-
tion and give it legal personality. This was
a sine qua non for the process of simplifica-
tion of the EU structure. The discussion on
this subject started during the 1996/97
IGC. The two solutions taken into account
were: leaving three organizations – the EU,
European Community and Euratom (the
two latter combined with the EU), or cre-
ating one organization – European Union
(and eliminating Euratom and the Europe-
an Community). 
Without doubt, the second solution is
simpler and clearer. It presumes, of course,
the existence of different legal regimes ac-
cording to the current pillar structure. Cho-
osing the first option would create several
problems and surely would not make the
EU any simpler. 
One of the most important results of the
work done by the Convention is the propo-
sal to transform the Union into an interna-
tional organization, which is clearly stated
in Part I, Art. 6. However, the proposed
transformation system is not fully consi-
stent. According thereto, the new European
Union is to take over all three pillars of the
existing EU and the European Community
but, for an unknown reason, leave out Eu-
ratom. 
Speaking of the structure of the Draft
Constitutional Treaty, one can see that it is
not very clear. Apart from leaving out Eura-
tom, the European Convention has left asi-
de a heavily discussed decision to divide the
Constitution into two separate blocks – the
first one grouping basic provisions, the se-
cond – operative provisions (the blocks we-
re to be differentiated by the revision clau-
se). The consequence is a Treaty without
a clear definition of the demarcation of se-
parate parts, which results in placing insti-
tutional laws in the first and third parts, se-
veral repetitions in the „introductory” or
„general” parts, and so on. Apart from that,
one can see no logical explanation for the
proposed structure – for instance, the soli-
darity clause is both regulated by articles in
the first as well as in the third part. This
creates ambiguity and has no substantive
explanation. It seems that the Draft Project
will need to undergo profound structural
changes during the Intergovernmental
Conference. 
Weaknesses of the Draft result from
drawbacks in the Convention formula. In
addition to differing attitudes present in
the Convention (it represented a wide sco-
pe of institutions and political organiza-
tions, and inspired profound discussions
within societies), it had several demerits as
well. The main one was the fact that 
the work of the Convention proceeded in a
somewhat parallel system – on one level
there were tense debates during sessions
backed by public discussions in the home
countries, on a totally different level there
was the work performed by the Presidium,
which handed out projects. To be totally ho-
nest, these projects quite often did not re-
flect the main themes of the debate. It is
hard to believe, but during the last session
of the Convention in July 2003, after han-
ding in the project on the Thessalonica
Summit, the Presidium opened a discussion
about the „fundamental” problem of chan-
ging the number of areas ruled under the
QMV regime (!), not to mention the fact
that the discussion about the third part of
the Constitution started only in the very
last days of the activities of the Convention. 
There was no clear definition of the man-
date of the Convention members (formally,
each member stood in his own name). That
did not help the cause of finding a good
compromise. Consequently, one can ask
questions such as: Who is the author of the
Draft Treaty? What is its formal status? The
response that the declaration of the Euro-
pean Council is a good starting point for the
IGC only partially answers these questions,
especially when it is obvious that the incer-
titude in the Convention's decision-making
process hurts particularly the interests 
of the candidate countries. Frankly 
speaking, the Draft is a document prone to
create tension. 
From the legal point of view, the Consti-
tutional Treaty is a successive revision tre-
aty (international agreement) implemented
according to Art. 48 TEU and ratified by
member states in accordance with their
constitutional procedures. Article IV-7 of
the Constitutional Treaty widens the proce-
dural scope by nominating a Convention ta-
sked with preparing the document. The
Constitutional Treaty is, therefore, an inter-
national agreement signed by sovereign co-
untries. The title „Constitution for Europe”
has only a symbolic meaning and does not
mean transforming the European Union in-
to a quasi-state – the Union will remain as
an international organization. The Treaty
introduces the right of the Member States
to leave the Union, and although this is
obvious from the perspective of internatio-
nal law we should still support its inclusion
in the Constitution. 
The creation of the European Union as
a legal entity is combined with the creation
of a catalogue of values on which the Union
bases its construction and which constitute
its ideological manifesto. The Draft Treaty
is underlining and expanding the axiology
of the Union. One can read in the Preamble
that Europe is a continent which has bro-
ught forth a civilization embedded in such
values as equality of people, freedom and
respect for reason. The set of values is rew-
ritten in the Preamble of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. 






































3. EUROPEAN UNION 
OPERATING PRINCIPLES
In the present legal framework of the
Union there is no set of rules to govern re-
lations between the Union and the Mem-
ber States. Certain such rules are mentio-
ned in Art. 5 of the first part of the Draft
Treaty. 
One of the most important changes is
that the Union cannot obtain competences
which have not been bestowed thereon by
the Member States. As a result of the rule
of subsidiarity, the role of national parlia-
ments is going to gain importance. Parlia-
ments will obtain information about propo-
sed bills simultaneously with the legislator,
and be privy to legal amendments and legi-
slative proposals of the European Parlia-
ment. 
A new proposal to appear is the primate
of the Union law (Art. I-10). In the current
political science doctrine, this principle has
been somewhat obscured and this rule is
bound to clarify the ambiguities. 
The Draft Treaty divides Union compe-
tences into exclusive, shared, coordinative,
supportive and supplementary (Art. I-11).
Additionally, the Draft Treaty establishes 
a flexibility clause (Art. I-17), which can
serve as a base for separating supportive
competences from others (analogically to
current Art. 308 TEC). 
The Common Foreign and Security Poli-
cy is alienated from the aforementioned
competences and constrained in a separate
provision (Art I-15). The division criteria
are rather vague and are not an improve-
ment on current treaties. 
It is not clear which bodies of the Union
are referred to as its institutions. 
Art I-18 par. 2 lists the European Parlia-
ment, European Council, Council of Mini-
sters, European Commission and the Court
of Justice. However, Title II of Part 1, called
„European Institutions”, adds the Europe-
an Central Bank, Court of Auditors and
other advisory organs to the list. Are then
the European Central Bank and the Court
of Auditors institutions of the Union or are
they not? To confuse the reader even fur-
ther, the fragment about institutions in Part
3 of the Treaty mentions the Court of Audi-
tors but does not say a word about the Eu-
ropean Central Bank. 
4. INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES
As we have already said, the Draft Treaty
does not provide a clear catalogue of Union
institutions. Consequently, we have deci-
ded to discuss all organs of the Union men-
tioned in different parts of the Draft Treaty
as institutions. 
European Parliament
All in all, the Treaty rewrites the main
competences of the European Parliament –
law-making (in cooperation with the Coun-
cil of Ministers), budgetary collaboration,
political control and consultative functions.
An important amendment is the right given
to the Council of Ministers to establish
a different composition of seats in the Par-
liament, thus implementing the digressive
proportionality principle (minimum 4 seats
per Member State). 
European Council
The Treaty does not change the functio-
ning of that institution but introduces seve-
ral minor changes to the composition of the
Council. The Treaty underlines the partici-
pation of the EU Foreign Minister in its ac-
tivities but does not state the exact forms of
that participation. When needed, Ministers
of the Council may decide to be accompa-
nied by one national minister (the Presi-
dent of the Commission would be accom-
panied by one of the Commissioners). The
European Council will meet quarterly. Me-
etings will be announced by the President
of the Council. Decisions will be adopted by
consensus. 
A novelty is the post of the President of
the Council. The president will be elected
by the Council itself for a maximum of two
2.5-year terms. 
Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers will be a law-
-making institution jointly with the Euro-
pean Parliament. In addition, it will per-
form important budgetary functions. It will
formulate Union policies and coordinate its
statutory tasks. 
The Council is composed of two forma-
tions: the Legislative and General Affairs
Council. The General Affairs Council is me-
ant as a link to the Commission and is ta-
sked with preparing meetings of the Coun-
cil of Ministers. The Treaty appoints the Fo-
reign Affairs Council, which is to flesh out
the Union's external policies on the basis of
strategic guidelines laid down by the Euro-
pean Council. Other formations of the Co-
uncil of Ministers will be established by the
European Council. 
The Treaty changes the formula of Quali-
fied Majority Voting. The new formula is
based on two principles – majority of states
and majority of population (sixty percent,
to be precise). The proposal is slated for im-
plementation as of 2009. It eliminates we-
ighted votes as one of the elements of the
voting procedure. 
The list of areas where QMV will be im-
plemented has been expanded. This issue
has been a problem for some time already –
some countries want to leave unanimity 
voting with respect to certain specific areas,
whereas others push for QMV standards.






































The biggest problem of the acceding 
countries is their inexperience and, conse-
quently, absence of identified national inte-
rests in those specific areas. 
European Commission
The Draft does not change the functio-
ning of the Commission – the guardian of
the Treaties. It confirms the principle of le-
gislative initiative of that body. As of 2009,
the Commission will be composed of the
President, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
13 European Commissioners (elected on
the bases of rotation). Additionally, the Pre-
sident may nominate (regular) Commissio-
ners, who will come from states other than
those already represented in the Commis-
sion. The difference between these two ty-
pes of Commissioners is that the latter will
have no right of vote at the sessions. 
Court of Justice
According to the Draft Treaty, the court
system will be composed of the European
Court of Justice, High Court and speciali-
zed courts. 
Other Institutions 
(European Central Bank, 
Court of Auditors, European
Investment Bank and others) 
The Treaty does not modify the compe-
tences of the European Central Bank. The
only changes concerning the Court of Audi-
tors result from the expansion of the Union
and were included in the Nice Treaty. The-
re are no major changes with respect to
other bodies of the Union. 
5. SOURCES AND 
CREATION OF LAW
The Draft totally modifies the catalogue
of legal acts of the Union. Nevertheless, the
new laws resemble their predecessors. The
most important modification is that the
Draft Treaty introduces hierarchical order
of legal acts (different from the order of le-
gal acts used at the national level). The acts
can be divided into two groups: legislative
acts (acts established on the basis of com-
petences written into the treaties) and acts
established on the basis of delegated legi-
slature. 
The Common Foreign and Security Poli-
cy has a different set of legal acts and the
Treaty proposes their new catalogue. Title
V (Exercise of the Union Competence), 
Chapter I (Common Provisions), does not
mention the instruments of the
CFSP; 
Chapter II (Specific Provisions) concentra-
tes on competences of different
institutions and only inciden-
tally mentions that the Europe-
an Council and the Council of
Ministers conduct „European
decisions” in this area. Frankly,
this is a very hazy way of intro-
ducing a set of regulations for
a specific policy. 
Article 195 in Part III provides a catalo-
gue of CFSP instruments. They are: 
general guidelines; 
decisions on actions of the Union; 
decisions on positions of the Union; and 
decisions on implementation of actions
and positions. 
Additionally, the Draft lists other deci-
sions included in articles spread all over
Part III of the Draft. They are: 
decision on strategic interests and objec-
tives of the Union (Art. 194), 
decisions on the Common Security and
Defence Policy (Art. 210 and others), 
decisions on the solidarity clause (Art.
231), and 
decisions on strengthen cooperation in
the field of CFSP
The proposed set of CFSP acts is totally
ambiguous and very complicated, which is
in opposition to the Laeken Declaration.
The elimination of the pillar structure has
created a legal mess in the CFSP and does
nothing to help understanding the configu-
ration of that policy. 
The Constitutional Treaty abolishes the
pillar structure thus changing the structure
of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justi-
ce (former third pillar). The set of legal acts
to be implemented in this area is identical
to the set of acts of other polices, notwith-
standing some exceptions (Art. I-41, Art
III-165). 
The Treaty implements vital changes in
law-making procedures. The general rule is
to simplify these procedures. A novelty is
the creation of an ordinary legislative pro-
cedure (Art. III-302). 
6. SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
AND POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The most important part of the EU sub-
stantive law is the Single Market. The au-
thors of the Draft Treaty did not present any
concept of the Single Market. Art. 9 of Part
I defines that the Union guarantees a free
flow of people, goods, services and capital,
but Art. 14 of Part III limits the market de-
finition to its economic description. On the
whole, the concept is copied from TEC with
minimal changes. 
The Treaty regulates several policies of
the Union and gives them a different status.
In addition to the Common Economic and
Monetary Policy, there are three other com-
mon policies: 
Agriculture and Fishery Policy; 
Transport Policy
Commercial Policy 
and two ordinary policies: social and
environmental. 
The most important change in the Econo-
mic and Monetary Policy is the creation of
the Eurogroup and modification of the law
on international relations between the EU
and third countries in the field of monetary
policy. From the perspective of countries
not participating in the euro, this modifica-
tion is not a positive one. It would be better
if non-euro country representatives could
participate in Eurogroup meetings. 
Apart from the amendments already
mentioned, the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy has been modified in several 






































areas in order to accommodate changes
that have occurred after the September 11
tragedy and the political crisis resulting
from the Iraqi intervention. For instance,
the list of Petersberg Missions has been
expanded. Furthermore, the Treaty partly
changes the concepts of structured coope-
ration (Art. I-40), mutual defence (Art. I-
-40) and solidarity clause (Art. I-42 and III-
-231), and establishes an European Arma-
ments, Research and Military Capabilities
Agency (Art. I-40). 
Speaking of the changes in the former
third pillar, one of the most controversial is
the establishment of the European Prosecu-
tor. The Prosecutor would be responsible
for investigating, prosecuting and bringing
to judgment the perpetrators of and accom-
plices in serious crimes affecting more than
one Member State. 
7. EVALUATION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Character of the Constitutional
Treaty and its structure
Evaluation: 
The Constitutional Treaty establishes se-
veral important EU reforms. Since these
reforms do not finalize the process of inte-
gration, the Treaty will be an important
step in that process, but only one in many
successive steps and by no means the final
one. The Constitutional Treaty will be an
international agreement signed by the
Member States. They are the ones to deci-
de whether it should be implemented. The
title „Constitution for Europe” has a sym-
bolic meaning which does not refer to
transforming the Union into a quasi-state.
The new Union will be an international or-
ganization based on an international treaty.
The Draft Treaty introduces the right to le-
ave the Union (Art. I-59), which should be
seen as a desirable step forward. The Tre-
aty needs several adjustments – both tech-
nical (the draft is not cohesive, has numero-
us repetitions, there is no defined division
between its first, third and fourth part) and
legislative.
Recommendations: 
The public debate on the significance of
the Treaty taking place in Poland should be
„de-dogmatized” – the Treaty introduces
some essential modifications in the func-
tioning of the EU but it is just one step for-
ward in European integration and should
not be seen as the final one. 
It is worth informing the public that the
Treaty is an international agreement and
that it defines the Union as an international
organization. 
One has to look carefully at structural
and technical modifications of the Treaty –
quite often these modifications reiterate
important political and economic problems. 
2. The regime 
of the European Union
Evaluation: 
The most important modification is the
transformation of the Union into a unified in-
ternational organization (giving it a legal perso-
nality). This move should be supported becau-
se unification is the sine qua non for the cre-
ation of a simple structure of the EU and sim-
plification of its decision-making procedures. 
There is one exception to the rule of unifi-
cation of the EU – Euratom. The fact that it
has been left aside shows that the Draft has
stopped short from tackling a full EU re-
form. The Union will remain a limping orga-
nization with some awkward inter-institu-
tional relations in place for no logical reason.
The unification of the EU structure (eli-
mination of pillars) is only a partial success.
The third pillar was abolished altogether
while parts of the second pillar remained.
These restructuring proposals are very con-
troversial and should be discussed in depth
during the IGC. Numerous technical objec-
tions notwithstanding, the main problem
lies in the proposed total de-fragmenting of
the CFSP, which pushes into an undefined
future the perspective of the creation of
a common European identity. 
The Draft Treaty establishes a catalogue of
European Union values. They are formulated
in such general way that their interpretation
remains an open question. This adaptable ap-
proach is very useful. However, the opposi-
tion to inserting in the Preamble a reference
to the Judeo-Christian tradition as an ele-
ment of European heritage is vexing. If the
Treaty is to serve as a Constitution for Euro-
pe, vital elements of European identity ought
to be stated in the document. Then again,
one must not forget that the Treaty includes
a modern set of regulations for interaction
between Churches and the European Union. 
The Draft description of the construction
of the Union is very helpful from the Polish
point of view. Most proposed amendments
are not new ideas but their wording and si-
gnificance have been made more specific.
As for Poland, we must regretfully acknow-
ledge that our country has not created any
mechanisms for effectively benefiting from
the strengthened role of national parlia-
ments or the rule of participatory democra-
cy, both proposed in the Draft Treaty. We
must support the concept of clarifying the
division of competences between the Union
and the Member States. 
Poland should approve the Single Market
proposals (with some small reservations).
The scheme of formalizing the Eurogroup
should then be opposed as something un-
needed. Proposals for Working Groups that
would transform relations between the eu-
ro-zone and the rest of the word are aw-
kward and should be eliminated. 
Recommendations: 
While approving of the EU unification
ideal, we should know the reasons why one






































of its organizations (Euratom) has not 
been dealt with. 
Poland should support the clarified con-
stitutional rules of the EU: the catalogue of
values, division of competences and sour-
ces of law (with some reservations). The
postulate to insert a reference to Europe's
Judeo-Christian tradition in the Treaty is
a matter of principle; however, we should
remember that an article of the Draft alre-
ady covers the issue of relations between
Churches and the EU. 
3. Selected institutional problems
– composition of the 
Commission, 
management of European 
Council and Council 
of Ministers activities, 
the EU Foreign Minister
Evaluation: 
In the sphere of institutional changes the
Treaty does not implement anything signi-
ficant. The idea of a radical reduction of the
number of Commissioners, management of
European Council activities and certain
aspects of creating a post of EU Foreign Mi-
nister leave some questions. Certain Co-
nvention proposals are highly controversial
and have been added to the Draft as a result
of political momentum. An in-depth debate
of these issues should be organized and the
Polish proposal to of a „group presidency”
could be a good starting point toward
a compromise. 
Proposals concerning the composition of
the Commission need an insightful analy-
sis. A radical reduction of the number of
Commissioners is not in the Polish inte-
rest. We should maintain the present num-
ber of Commissioners and should vote aga-
inst the appointment of non-voting Com-
missioners because that will blur the deci-
sion-making process. A higher number of
Commissioners will enable Poland to be re-
presented in the Commission more frequ-
ently and fully. 
The appointment of an EU Foreign Mini-
ster is all in all acceptable, but we should
insist on a clear definition of the length of
his/her term in office (logically, it should
be the same as a Commissioner's) and on
clear rules of the rotation sequence (suc-
cessive ministers selected by nationality or
geographical region). The argument that
practice will create the rules is very delusi-
ve – in practice, it will be very difficult to
dislodge a „lingering” minister put in the
position by one of the big states. 
The proposed system of managing Coun-
cil of Ministers activities is a very complica-
ted compromise between big and small
Member States; in this proposal, the Treaty
favours the big states by handing them the
two main jobs – European Council Presi-
dent and EU Foreign Minister. Poland wo-
uld benefit from a more balanced solution. 
The idea of reducing the number of for-
mations in the Council of Ministers should
be reconsidered – the Draft gives only illu-
sionary specifications in this matter. The
establishment of the Legislative Council is
rightfully criticized – every formation sho-
uld be involved in legislation (to the extent
of its mandate, of course). The present
practice of the European Council establi-
shing formations of the Council of Mini-
sters (of which there are currently nine)
should be promoted, on the condition that
the number of formations is reasonable and
appropriate to the needs. This solution will
secure the needed flexibility and – what is
extremely important for the acceding coun-
tries – ensure involvement of the required
number of high-ranking functionaries in
European Union activities. 
Recommendations: 
Poland should without any doubt opt for
a unified composition of the Commission
and oppose the idea of non-voting Commis-
sioners. At the present stage, the concept
„one country – one commissioner” should
be preserved (until the EU has 27 members
as stated in the Nice Treaty – even then in
no event less than 20 Commissioners). 
The rule of equal rotation and the rule
that each new Member State should have
its own Commissioner as soon as it joins
the EU should be written into the project as
well. If this happened, the post of the Mini-
ster of Foreign Affairs would be an impor-
tant concession for the big states
The formula of „group presidency”,
which is a good compromise, could be ba-
sed on the following rules: 
The Foreign Minister would keep the se-
at of Foreign Affairs Council Chairman
(concession to the big states); 
The presidency of other Council of Mini-
sters formations would be handed to gro-
ups of countries for a term of at least one
year – each country would chair the for-
mation that best fits its specialization; 
We could put forward the concept of a ro-
tating presidency of the European Council
(the Convention's proposal to establish
a permanent presidential post is not very
popular and the suggestion to have some-
one „not from the club” governing 
the heads of European states is outright
absurd). 
The group of presiding countries would
be elected by the European Council,
which would also decide which country
would head which formation, and which
would preside over the European Council
itself. 
Assuming that the number of formations
would be between 6 and 8, each Member
State would participate in group presi-
dency every 4 or 5 years. 
The proposal to establish a post of EU
Foreign Minister is worth supporting be-
cause it will give a solid worldwide identity
to the Union. However, the minister's term
in office and the rotation sequence must be
clearly defined. 
Poland should be flexible about the num-
ber of Commissioners and oppose the limi-
tation of the legislative role of the Europe-
an Council to just one Council of Ministers
formation. 
4. Qualified Majority Voting
Evaluation: 
The political discourse in Poland is focu-
sing solely on re-opening the „Nice packa-
ge” in the Draft Treaty. However, we must
understand that the problem of the number
of weighted votes is strictly linked to other
important issues – allocation of seats in






































other institutions (mainly the European
Parliament and the European Commission)
and, especially, selecting policy areas where
QMV would be implemented. The Conven-
tion wrote its proposals without giving
consideration to a wider perspective and
only for the purpose of amending the Nice
Treaty before the enlargement. In some cases,
decision-making procedures were alarmingly
amateurish, as for example the proposal to di-
scuss certain areas as „technical amend-
ments” after the Draft Treaty is deposited in
Thessalonica! Therefore, these problems ne-
ed to be re-discussed during the IGC.
At the present stage, the elimination of
weighted votes as an element of QMV deci-
sion-making process is disadvantageous to
small, mid-size and weaker EU Member
States (weighted votes make it easier to bu-
ild veto minorities able to block resolu-
tions). From the Polish perspective, this
has a double negative impact – the Nice
Treaty gave Poland a privileged position,
which will be severely weakened by the de-
mographic factor in the QMV system pro-
posed by the Convention: weighted votes
are an element of a system of communica-
ting vessels which includes the allocation
of seats in the European Parliament (a bo-
dy that co-decides in areas falling under the
QMV regime) and the formula of the com-
position of the European Commission (big
states have lost a second commissioner due
to the enlargement so they aim at being
compensated in the decision-making pro-
cess). The status of Poland in the decision-
-making process is therefore not only limi-
ted by the number of votes but also by the
composition of the Commission and the al-
location of seats in the Parliament. 
The possibility of gaining a form of com-
pensation in the new allocation of seats in
the European Parliament is possible, but
for Poland it will be a sensitive matter be-
cause the new system harms small states to
a much greater extent than Poland. They
will also want compensation, which will le-
ad to a clash of interests mainly among the
acceding countries. 
Consideration should be given to suppor-
ting the community method by widening
the scope of implementation of the „passa-
relle method” (as proposed by the Conven-
tion – see Part II, Art. I-24, Sec. 4). As com-
pensation for our agreement to keep the
present voting system, we could promote
the use of the path method in shifting poli-
cy areas from the unanimity regime to the
QMV regime. This solution would be flexi-
ble by virtue of it supporting an evolutiona-
ry approach to strengthening the communi-
ty method, making it possible for new
Member States to gain experience of the Eu-
ropean market and, most importantly, gu-
aranteeing the dynamics of EU integration. 
Recommendations: 
Maintaining the QMV decision-making
procedure decided in Nice is in Poland's
current political interest. We can assume
that a certain number of countries will sup-
port our postulates and, consequently, we
should expect a great deal of pressure from
the big countries. Indeed, large Member
States are aware that, after the enlargement
by mainly small and mid-size countries,
forcing through a change from which large
states will benefit so much will be almost
impossible. 
There are several areas where Poland will
need to negotiate to maintain its present
strong status in the EU decision-making
process: the problem does not end with the
number of votes but also covers the formu-
la for the composition of the Commission
and allocation of seats in the European Par-
liament, and extends in particular to the po-
ssibility of shifting certain policies to the
QMV regime. All these factors have to be
taken into account during the IGC. 
The most important problem (where na-
tional interests are directly affected) is the
issue of shifting policy areas from the una-
nimity procedure to QMV. Poland has to be
very careful in this matter, especially when
dealing with problem areas on which it do-
es not have a clearly defined policy. There
are great differences of interests among
present EU members – Poland has to be ve-
ry careful when building coalitions because
the risk of manipulation is high. 
We should consider supporting the esta-
blishment of a flexible decision-making
process ('passarelle method') when shifting
policy areas from the unanimity procedure
to QMV. This element should be key in our
negotiations. We should underline that our
proposal benefits the integration process. 
5. Common Foreign 
and Security Policy
Evaluation: 
We should approve new rules governing
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
but be more reticent with respect to the
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Seve-
ral points in that policy need to be recon-
sidered and discussed again during the
IGC (particularly those relating to the 
NATO role). 
The Draft clearly aims at accelerating the
CFSP and, especially, the CSDP due to fle-
xibility of regulations. The proposals allow
(with few exceptions) a differentiation of
cooperation between Member States. Until
now, most Member States were rather scep-
tical about such idea declaring that this de-
licate matter called for maintaining the 'lo-
west common denominator'. 
The project elasticizes the whole CFSP is-
sue by widening the implementation of the
QMV procedure. In addition, it gives the Eu-
ropean Council general authorization to de-
cide (unanimously) the areas where the pro-
cedure would be implemented. Strengthe-
ned cooperation is possible today in all CSFP
areas (the only exception being those CSDP
areas where a group of states can implement
action without any special restrictions). In
the most important cases, namely where the
alliance clause and structural cooperation
are concerned, a full detachment is possible. 
The idea of elasticizing the CSFP by wi-
dening the scope of QMV implementation
seems quite logical, but proposals going
beyond that point threaten to de-fragmenti-
ze the CFSP and seem to serve no other
purpose than to write current political di-
vergences into the Treaty. A sensible com-
promise would be to involve the European
Council in the decision-making process (ac-
cording to general requirements for streng-
thened cooperation). 
Proposals linked to CSFP legal sources are
burdened with the Draft's overall structural
weaknesses. It is hard to resist the feeling
that the dogma of standardized wording
with respect to all the former pillars has do-
minated over the usefulness of the idea. That
approach did nothing for the clarity of the
project or for the coherence of the solutions. 






































One would be justified in criticizing the
Convention for having failed to introduce
any significant way of strengthening the de-
mocratic legitimization of CFSP decisions.
It is not by increasing the number of CFSP
areas which must be reported to the Euro-
pean Parliament that the deficit will shrink.
The Convention did not propose the use of
national parliaments in monitoring the
CFSP process, whereas we believe that in-
volving national parliaments would be
a step in the right direction. 
Recommendations: 
This part of the Draft text needs to be
considered from several angles. In their
present form, proposals put forward in im-
portant policy areas reflect current political
controversies and do not generate condi-
tions needed to strengthen the European
identity in international relations. 
The proposal of a structural cooperation
clearly ensues from current political con-
flicts and can lead to the creation of sub--
groups in the EU, as well as to the weake-
ning of trans-Atlantic relations. It should be
rejected. 
The formula of 'strengthened coopera-
tion' should be looked at from the legislati-
ve and substantive perspective. 
A great deal of consideration should be
given to the discussion of elasticizing CFSP
activities, especially in the case of streng-
thened cooperation. 
Poland should wholeheartedly support
the idea of widening the scope of the Pe-
tersberg Tasks and establishing an Arma-
ment Agency. However, we should propose
the involvement of national parliaments in
this area as a way of increasing the demo-
cratic legitimization of the process. 
6. Procedure of action – 
the formula of Convention 
activities and the importance 
of the Intergovernmental 
Conference
Evaluation: 
The formula of the Convention (as a sta-
ge in preparing reversionary treaties) sho-
uld be promoted, mainly due to the fact
that it brings the decision-making process
closer to the EU citizen. The role of the Co-
nvention should be limited to developing
solutions, because the role to make deci-
sions is reserved to the Intergovernmental
Conference and to it alone. 
The performance of the Convention has
clearly shown weak points in the Conven-
tion formula – particularly from the acce-
ding countries perspective. Members of the
Convention did not have a clear mandate
and, as a result, the decision-making power
was concentrated in the hands of the Co-
nvention Presidium and was not very trans-
parent. This is why, in many cases, the final
Draft does not reflect the main lines of the
plenary discussion. We in Poland understo-
od too late that the Convention was not
just a 'club of talking heads' but a place
where a coherent national strategy should
be presented. 
It is hard to resist the feeling that the ve-
ry unclear decision-making process served
the purpose of passing through important
political decisions before the closure of the
enlargement process. The short period 
between the Convention and the IGC, 
as well as the short duration of the IGC it-
self, support that impression. The IGC will
work under time pressures, which will not
help an in-depth discussion of existing pro-
blems, particularly those affecting the inte-
rests of the acceding countries. 
The main task of the IGC is to create
a good draft of the Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe, which can be ra-
tified by all Member States, including those
that will join on May 1st, 2004. We have to
bear in mind that in these countries – parti-
cularly in Poland – the societal acceptance
of the Treaty will play a key role in the rati-
fication process. 
Recommendations: 
The Draft Treaty is a good starting point
for a discussion. Many proposals of funda-
mental importance need to be re-discus-
sed, as illustrated by postulates brought
forward by both the Member States and the
European Commission. Poland has the ri-
ght to demand a thorough discussion, unli-
mited in terms of the level at which it takes
place and topics it covers. Working under
time pressure is not in the interest of our
country. 
Poland should be against diminishing the
role of the IGC. It is an important body
with foundations in Art. 48 TEU, responsi-
ble for preparing the final formula of the
Union's reform. The Convention had only
a political legitimization and its role was li-
mited to preparing the draft; postulates
brought forward by Member States ought
to be discussed at the Intergovernmental
Conference. 
The procedure of including the Conven-
tion in future revisions of the Constitutional
Treaty should be whole-heartedly suppor-
ted by Poland. 
7. Ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty in Poland 
and supportive measures 
of home politics
Evaluation: 
The Treaty will constitute an internatio-
nal agreement subject to ratification by
Member States according to their national
constitutions. In Poland, the basis for the
ratification process will be Art. 90 of 
the Polish Constitution, which provides for
ratification by the president, by legislation
or by referendum. One has to bear in mind
that each reversionary treaty will be sub-
mitted to that procedure. If a referendum is
held, the voter turnout must exceed 50%
for its outcome to be declared valid. In fact,
the present Polish constitutional formula
might block European integration owing
precisely to a low voter turnout at the refe-
rendum. 
The project of the Treaty has several inte-
resting proposals which strengthen partici-
patory democracy and widen the scope of
participation by national parliaments. 
Recommendations: 
Irrespective of the chosen ratification me-
thod, Poland has to reconsider the ratifica-
tion process written in the Constitution 
and has to eliminate the need for the 50% vo-
ter turnout. This change would reflect the






































procedure needed to amend the Constitution
itself (Art. 235, Sec. 6, of the Polish Consti-
tution). 
An effective application of the possibili-
ties created by the Draft depends on natio-
nal possibilities. These mechanisms have
not been implemented in Poland yet. The
role of the Sejm (lower house of the Polish
parliament), the Senate and the regions in
the EU decision-making process has to be
bolstered. 
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